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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Roller challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained from a search of his truck bed, which contained a motorcycle partially covered by tarp.
He argued the district court should have granted his motion to suppress because Officer
Churchfield’s observation of the motorcycle VIN was an unlawful intrusion. He further argued,
in the alternative, Officer Churchfield did not have probable cause to search the truck bed
pursuant to the automobile exception. The State responded and asserted the search was lawful.
Mr. Roller now replies to some, but not all, of the State’s arguments. For the reasons stated
herein and in his opening brief, Mr. Roller maintains the district court erred by denying his
motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were articulated in Mr. Roller’s
Appellant’s Brief. (App. Br., pp.1–5.) They are not repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Roller’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Roller’s Motion To Suppress
Mr. Roller presented three main arguments challenging the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. First, he argued the district court made an erroneous factual finding Officer
Churchfield observed the VIN from his first photograph of the motorcycle. (App. Br., pp.9–11.)
Mr. Roller asserted substantial and competent evidence showed Officer Churchfield observed the
VIN from his second photograph, which he obtained by reaching under the tarp and into the
motorcycle’s interior. (App. Br., pp.9–11.) Second, he argued the district court erred by
determining Officer Churchfield observed the VIN in open view. (App. Br., pp.12–19.)
Mr. Roller contended Officer Churchfield searched the truck bed by physically invading its
protected space or by intruding on Mr. Roller’s privacy interest in the tarp-covered portion of the
motorcycle. (App. Br., pp.12–20.) Third, Mr. Roller submitted Officer Churchfield did not have
probable cause for the search. (App. Br., pp.20–21.) For these reasons, Mr. Roller argued the
district court should have granted his suppression motion.
In response, the State deemed Mr. Roller’s first argument a “red herring.” (Resp.
Br., p.6.) The State submitted any distinction between the first and second photograph was
irrelevant because Officer Churchfield took both photographs from “a ‘plain view’ vantage
point.” (Resp. Br., p.6.) The State also argued Mr. Roller’s position was a red herring because,
after the two photographs, a second officer observed the VIN with a flashlight. (Resp. Br., pp.6,
8–10.) Mr. Roller submits the State is mistaken on both points.
First, the distinction between the photographs is significant because one was obtained
through a search and the other was not. As shown by these screenshots from Officer
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Churchfield’s bodycam video, the first photograph of the yellow sticker was in the openly
exposed area of the truck bed:
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(State’s Ex. 1,1 00:39, 00:50.) These screenshots show Officer Churchfield’s approach to the
truck bed and his first photograph of the yellow sticker. (See State’s Ex. 1, 00:30–00:53.) As
shown above, Officer Churchfield did not reach under the straps and tarp to take the photograph
of the yellow sticker. He simply pointed his camera at the yellow sticker and took the picture.
(See State’s Ex. 1, 00:49–00:53.) Officer Churchfield’s second photograph, however, was
considerably more intrusive:

1

The State’s Exhibit 1 refers to the second of four bodycam videos, saved as:
“AXON_Flex_Video_2016-08-22_0534_Churchfield 2.”
5

(State’s Ex. 1, 00:58.) These screenshots show Officer Churchfield reach through the straps and
under the tarp into the interior of the motorcycle to capture the VIN. (See State’s Ex. 1, 00:53–
1:06.) Mr. Roller maintains Officer Churchfield did not obtain this second photograph from his
“plain view” of the VIN. As shown by the bodycam video, Officer Churchfield conducted a
search to take the second photograph. Mr. Roller thus disputes the State’s position characterizing
his first argument as a “red herring.” To the contrary, Mr. Roller’s first argument is a key
component of the Fourth Amendment violation.
Second, Mr. Roller asserts the State’s reliance on the second officer’s subsequent view of
the VIN to cancel out any Fourth Amendment violation by Officer Churchfield is misplaced.
After Officer Churchfield conducted the search to obtain the second photograph, a second officer
shined his flashlight on the motorcycle:
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(State’s Ex. 1, 1:47.) This second officer looked at the VIN three times, and this screenshot
captures his second view. (See State’s Ex. 1, 1:41–1:58.) All three views were similar in the
officer’s position in relation to the truck bed and motorcycle. The bodycam video then shows
Officer Churchfield and the second officer speaking to each other, both officers looking at
Officer Churchfield’s phone, and the second officer writing down a VIN. (State’s Ex. 1, 1:58–
2:18.) The district court found, because the second officer saw the VIN and wrote it down, “the
use of the camera is not critical to discovering the VIN number because the other office can
clearly see it just by shining his light on it.” (Tr., p.55, Ls.1–4.) The district court then held
Officer Churchfield’s photograph “is simply what could be seen in open view when highlighted
with a flashlight or enhanced by the light of a flashlight.” (Tr., p.55, Ls.8–10.)
The State relies on the second officer’s actions to argue Officer Churchfield’s view of the
VIN was also in “plain view.” (Resp. Br., pp.9–11.) Similarly, the State contends any distinction
between the first and second photograph is “irrelevant” because Officer Churchfield’s “use of the
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camera was not critical to whether the VIN number was in plain view.” (Resp. Br., p.9.) There
are three flaws in the State’s argument. First, Officer Churchfield did not engage in the same
action as the second officer. Officer Churchfield’s observation of the VIN with his phone
through the tarp and straps was more intrusive than the second officer’s conduct of leaning over
the truck bed and viewing the VIN with his flashlight. Second, the second officer’s actions do
not counteract Officer Churchfield’s violation. The Fourth Amendment does not substitute what
the police should have done or could have done for what the police actually did. See State v.
Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 32 (2017) (rejecting the State’s proposed inevitable discovery
justification because it would require speculation on the investigation the police “could” have
done, rather than what the police “really did”). Here, the second officer’s action was part of one
course of conduct flowing from Officer Churchfield’s illegal action. There is no evidence in the
record that the second officer would have engaged in the same action absent Officer
Churchfield’s initial search.2 Third, and relatedly, there is no evidence in the record on the
second officer’s observations at all, other than what can be inferred from Officer Churchfield’s
bodycam video. The second officer did not testify. As such, there was no evidence on how much
of the VIN the second officer was able to see or read. And, as for Officer Churchfield, he could
not read the letters without the photograph. (Tr., p.29, Ls.19–23.) He agreed he needed his phone
camera to see the VIN. (Tr., p.29, L.24–p.30, L.1.) Moreover, the bodycam video confirms the
officers were working together to piece together the VIN. (State’s Ex. 1, 1:58–2:18.) There is no
evidence pertaining to whether the second officer wrote down the VIN from his observation

2

Mr. Roller also notes the State did not argue any exception to the exclusionary rule in the
district court. (R., pp.86–92; Tr., p.43, L.12–p.46, L.5.) See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho
271, 275–76 (2017) (requiring the State to argue exceptions to the exclusionary rule in the
district court to preserve the issue for appellate review).
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alone, from Officer Churchfield’s phone, or from some combination of the two. The second
officer may have confirmed or filled in some missing letters after Officer Churchfield’s
photograph, but Officer Churchfield clearly relied on his photograph for the investigation.
Therefore, the second officer’s apparent view of the VIN does not mean the VIN was in open
view for Officer Churchfield or that Officer Churchfield did not engage in a search,
In response to Mr. Roller’s second argument, the State submits Officer Churchfield did
not conduct a search because he only viewed the exposed areas of the motorcycle. (Resp.
Br., pp.10–11.) Mr. Roller disagrees. He asserts Officer Churchfield viewed more than the open
view area of the motorcycle. (See State’s Ex. 1, 00:53–1:06.) Although the district court found
Officer Churchfield did not move the tarp or straps, (Tr., p.55, Ls.5–7), Officer Churchfield still
engaged in a search by intruding the protected space under the tarp to photograph the interior of
the motorcycle. This was a search under the property rights or reasonable expectation of privacy
test, and Mr. Roller respectfully refers this Court to his briefing on this issue. (App. Br., pp.12–
20.)
Finally, in response to Mr. Roller’s third argument, the State contends Officer
Churchfield had probable cause to search the truck bed pursuant to the automobile exception.
(Resp. Br., pp.11–15.) Mr. Roller argues the State has shown nothing more than reasonable
suspicion, which is insufficient to justify a warrantless search. (See App. Br., pp.20–21.) He
asserts the district court erred by upholding Officer Churchfield’s search under this alternative
theory of the automobile exception.
For the reasons argued herein and in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Roller submits the district
court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Roller respectfully requests this Court reverse or vacate the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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